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ABSTRACT 
The present study describes the effect that different demographic developments will 
have on the Swedish pension system. Projections of expenditures for old age 
pensions, survivor pensions, and disability pensions were made for the period 1985- 
2050 on the basis of future developments of the population and its structure (age, 
sex, and marital status). Six demographic scenarios were formulated: Benchmark, 
High Fertility, Low Mortality, West European, National 1, and National 2 scenarios. 
Together they cover a wide range of demographic developments, not to say all 
probable developments. 
A model of the current Swedish pension system is combined with all six 
demographic scenarios. Projections of expenditures as well as of contributions and 
benefits in the pension system are made. The pension system will be put under 
severe strain whatever the demographic development. In all scenarios, expenditures 
will continue to increase until 2030, in the beginning as a result of the maturing of 
the system, but after the turn of the century mainly as a result of demographic 
changes. Expenditures will increase by about 75% in the "most favorable" scenarios 
(BenchmarkIHigh Fertility, Western European) and by 100% to 130% in the "least 
favorable" scenarios (Low Mortality, National 1 and 2). After 2030, expenditures 
decrease in all scenarios except in National 2 where they remain constant. The 
contribution rates will have to be increased from about 20% in 1985 to between 
36% (National 1) and 49.9% (Low Mortality) of the wage sum in 2030. 
The impact on contributions and benefits of three selected policy measures are 
studied: a raising of the retirement age by two years, an extension of the number 
of years on which benefits are based and an increase in labor force. All three 
measures will ease the pressure on the system but only to some extent. The main 
conclusion is that there is a need for a fundamental change in the Swedish pension 
system. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS ON THE SWEDISH 
PENSION SYSTEM 
Tommy Bengtsson and Agneta Kiuse 
Lund University 
Lund, Sweden 
In Sweden as in many other West European countries, the public pension system 
is designed principally as a "pay-as-you-go" system, i.e. a system where the 
contributions in one year are used for payments of pension benefits in the same 
year. Such systems are sensitive to population trends and most of all to shifts in the 
relation between the number of persons in the labor force and the number of 
pensioners. The aging population revealed by demographic projections gives cause 
for disquiet, and has resulted in a number of alarm reports both from the OECD 
and from individual countries. 
The aim of the present study is to describe what effects different demographic 
developments will have on the Swedish public pension system. The report 
constitutes the groundwork of a major comparative study of the effects of 
demographic changes on the pension systems of 12 countries. This work is being 
carried out at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, 
Austria, where a demographic model and a pension model have been designed. 
This study begins with a short description of the Swedish pension system and, from 
a historical perspective, the Swedish demographic development. Then the 
demographic model is described together with projections of the population and the 
resulting labor force. The pension model of IIASA, adjusted to the Swedish pension 
system, is presented. By connecting the demographic model and the pension model, 
projections are made of contributions and benefits in the pension system. 
1. THE SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM 
The Swedish public pension system consists of a basic pension, the folkpension, 
which is the same for everybody, and a supplementary' pension based on previous 
income although with limitations on lower and upper income counted as 
pensionable income (the "floor" and the "ceiling") and the number of years of 
pensionable income. Both systems feature early retirement pensions, including 
disability pensions, old age pensions and provision for survivors.' The public 
pension system is price-indexed in that benefits are linked to a so-called 
base-amount (B), which broadly speaking follows the consumer price index. 
Both the basic pension and the supplementary pension are organized on the 
pay-as-you-go system. Both are financed by means of payroll taxes. The basic 
folkpension was introduced in 1913 and the allmiinnu tillai.ggspensionering (general 
supplementary pension scheme, referred to below by the customary abbreviation of 
ATP) in 1960, benefits first being paid in 1963.~ Table 1 gives certain details of the 
Swedish pension system in 1985. 
The scale of pensioners' consumption, and therefore the apportionment of 
consumption between employed persons and pensioners, is determined to a large 
extent by the pension system. Figure 1 shows how this apportionment evolved 
between 1970 and 1984. 
Figure 1. Old age pension per person aged 65 years and over in relation to wage 
per person aged 20-64. Curve 1 shows the proportion excluding other retirement 
pensions; curve 2 includes other retirement pensions. Source: Kruse 1988. 
*1n addition to these public pension systems there are negotiated pension schemes agreed between 
parties on the labor market as well as a wide variety of private insurances. These insurances are not 
dealt with in this report. They form only a small proportion of total pensions as far as today's 
pensioners are concerned, but this proportion is expected to grow. 
2 ~ o r  a description of the system's history, see Bengtsson and Fridlizius, 1!292a. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Swedish pension schemes, 1985. Source: SOS 
198511986; RFV 1987. 
Basic Pension Supplementary Pension 
Number of pensions paid (1000s) 
old age 1,480 
disability 323 
survivors 72 
Total benefits paid (billion SEK) 
old age 28.3 (36.9*) 35.0 
disability 5.9 (8.8*) 10.0 
survivors 1.3 (IS*) 4.6 
Average old age pension benefit (SEK) 
19,122 (24,392*) 33,792 
Contribution rate 9.45 10.0 
Income bases for calculating benefits - 
Number of years required to qualify for 
any pension - 
full pension - 
Average of 15 
best years 
Floor (ceiling) for calculating 
benefits - Yes (Yes) 
contributions no (no) no (no) 
* includmg pension supplement, municipal housing allowance, children and handicap supplement. 
The sharp rise in average pensions relative to wages is due partly to the fact that 
the ATP system is still in its building-up phase, which is characterized by generous 
transitional rules, and partly to the indexation method relating pension benefits to 
inflation instead of growth rate. The system is now fully built out but is still in a 
process of maturity that will not be concluded until about the turn of the century 
or shortly thereafter. During the initial phase of ATP, contributions were fixed at 
a higher rate than necessary in order to cover benefit payments, and this gave rise 
to some accumulation of funds. These funds amount today to about 360,000 million 
SEK This figure can be viewed in relation to the annual outgoings, which amounted 
to 53,000 million SEK in 1989. Between 10 and 15% of disbursements on 
supplementary (ATP) pensions were financed by interests earned by the funds in 
certain years during the 1980s when revenue from contributions did not suffice to 
cover pension benefits. 
Supplementary pension benefits under the ATP regulations are established not as 
a proportion of contemporaneous wage-incomes but as a proportion of the 
pensioner's average income during the best fifteen years. The value of this income 
is protected by means of the consumer price index, as are pension benefits. 
Determining pension benefits in this way means, firstly, that the system has a 
"memory" of earlier economic events, and secondly, that all adaptation to changes 
in incomes and/or demographic structure is thrown on to the contributions side, i.e. 
on the employed in the form of changed contribution rates. The National Swedish 
Insurance Board makes calculations of the contribution rate necessary to cover the 
pension expenditures according to today's pension rules. Through its "memory" the 
Swedish pension system is sensitive to the economic growth rate. In Table 2 
calculations given different growth rates are shown. 
Table 2. Expenditures on the basic pension3 and ATP as a share of the wage bill. 
Source: RFV 1987. 
Yearly growth rate in GDP 
0% 1% 2% 
1995 26.3 23.6 22.4 
2015 43.8 33.7 26.4 
2035 50.1 30.0 22.5 
Evidently the pension system is extremely sensitive to the economic growth rate. At 
a yearly growth rate of 2%, only rather small increases in the contribution rate will 
be necessary, both compared to the contribution rate of today (ca. 20%) and 
compared to the contribution rates that will be necessary with lower growth rates. 
This is due partly to the fact that at a higher growth rate the contribution base 
grows faster and partly because the ceiling in ATP limits the pension benefits to an 
increasing proportion of pensioners. There will be tensions in the system regardless 
of whether the economic growth is high or low. At low growth rates we certainly can 
expect tensions as the contributions have to be raised by 50% or more. At higher 
growth rates we can expect tensions as the link between previous income and 
pension benefits is weakened. Pressure not to keep the ceiling is probable which in 
turn will mean that contributions will have to be raised. 
Both the legally established and the actual retirement ages (65 and 63 years 
respectively) are the same for men and women. Each individual can begin drawing 
pension benefits between the ages of 60 and 70 years by electing for advanced or 
deferred withdrawals of pension rights with a resultant actuarially-calculated 
reduction or augmentation of benefit. There are also provisions for partial pensions 
30nly expenditures financed by pay-roll tax are included, that is about 80% of the expenditures 
on basic pension. Thus the figures are an underestimation. 
between the ages of 60 and 65, and for early retirement pensions. Disability 
pensions are eligible to all age groups but early retirement pensions have been 
granted not only on health grounds but also for labor market reasons to persons 
between 60 and 65 years of age. Also, in this age group a milder form of disability 
test is made. The availability of early retirement pensions for labor market reasons 
was changed in 1991. Since that time no new early retirement pensions for labor 
market reasons have been granted. Very limited advantage has been taken of the 
advanced withdrawal option, in contrast to both partial retirement and early 
retirement pensions for labor market reasons. This is not very surprising since both 
the latter options contain a large element of subsidy (see Kruse and Soderstrom, 
1989). The placing of floor and ceiling on the benefit side and not on the 
contribution side, the 15-year rule for the calculation of pension benefits, and the 
fact that 30 years suffice for entitlement to full pension means that from the 
individual's point of view, the link between contributions and benefits received is 
very weak. The effect of these rules is that the pension system subsidizes leisure 
time or non-market oriented work and creates incentives for a diminution of the 
labor supply. 
2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT 
The pattern of demographic development during the twentieth century has been 
similar in most industrial countries. Birth rates and family size have gradually 
diminished while average life expectancy has increased. The decreasing number of 
births is the major determinant of the aging process, i.e. the increasing proportion 
of elderly. However, the trend towards declining births has been interrupted from 
time to time. A substantial rise, a "baby boom", occurred during the 1940s. There 
was another such rise in the 1960s although not as strong as in the 1940s. These 
periodical booms have resulted in long-term wave-like movements as well as 
deformations of the age structure of the population. Sweden furnishes an example 
of this (Figure 2). As regards the timing, strength and duration of the waves of 
births, however, the trend has not always been the same in different countries. 
In a number of countries, including England, Denmark and Sweden, the rise in the 
birth rate during the 1940s was considerably sharper than during the 1960s. In other 
countries, such as West Germany, Austria and Norway, the birth peak of the 1960s 
was the dominant one. In all of these countries the rises were of relatively short 
duration. However, in other countries again, including the United States, the rise 
in births was of longer duration. 
Thus, birth rates in Sweden have followed the general trend--long-term falling birth 
rates interrupted by temporary rises--while at the same time the pattern has been 
unique in that timing, strength and duration have not always coincided with the 
trend in other countries. This is underlined by the fact that even today Sweden 
shows birth rates which differ from those in the outside world. Birth rates have 
increased remarkably during the last few years, which means that if birth rates do 
not decline again, Sweden's population is self-reproducing, a phenomenon which is 
almost unique in the industrialized western world today even though several 
countries are experiencing an increase in their birth rates just now.4 
When birth rates are rising rapidly, as during the 1940s and 1960s, these factors act 
together. Which factor is of most significance varies. That the crude birth rate was 
considerably higher during the 1940s than during the 1960s (the figure was 29% 
higher in 1944 than in 1964) is attributable primarily to the higher proportion of 
females of childbearing age during the 1940s. This is shown, for instance, by the fact 
that the TFR (Total Fertility Rate), which is independent of the age structure, was 
only insignificantly higher during the 1940s than during the 1960s (Figure 3; in 1944 
it was only 5% higher than 1964)' 
Figure 2. Crude birth rate (CBR) and crude marriage rate (CMR), 1900-1989; per 
rnille. 
40ne West European country which also has high fertility is Ireland. Some of the East European 
countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia also have high fertility. 
%e period cumulative fertility is accordingly not affected by the age structure of the population. 
On the other hand it is affected by the timing of childbearing in the families. In making prognoses, 
therefore, it is preferable to base oneself on the cumulative fertility for each generation separately, i.e. 
the cohort cumulative fertility, which is a measure of how many children a female who herself belongs 
to a certain birth cohort bears in the course of her whole fertile period. This measure is independent 
of whether childbearing is concentrated within a certain period or not. The cohort aggregated fertility 
has changed during the twentieth century on very similar lines in the majority of European countries 
apart from France and England but at different levels. See Bourgeois-Pichat, 1986. Cohort cumulative 
fertility is a great help in enabling future fertility to be estimated, but when it comes to the s i g ~ ~ c a n c e  
of fertility for changes in the age structure of the population it is not this measure which is of greatest 
interest but the overall birth rate, i.e. the number of births per 1 0  of mean population. 
1.50 l 1  I I I I I I I I I 
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Figure 3. Total fertility rate (TFR), 1940-1989. 
The TFR today is almost 2.1. The question is whether it will continue rising to the 
same level as during previous peak years, i.e. to 2.5-2.6. In the official population 
prognosis for 1989, which is based on analysis of the cohort fertility, it was 
estimated that the TFR would already be diminishing during 1990, which turned out 
to be incorrect. Despite the fact that the prognosis underestimated the birth rate in 
the short term it is still unlikely that fertility would reach the level of the 1960s. 
One reason among others is that the large number of mothers belonging to the 
1940s generation will soon be moving out of the fertile age range. By virtue of the 
fact that the proportion not living in paired relationships has increased it is hardly 
likely that the females bearing children in the immediate future will manage to 
compensate both for this group and for the low fertility of the 1940s generation. 
Mamage frequency and birth rates have followed each other during the past fifty 
years, which was not the case in the early years of the twentieth century when birth 
rates halved while mamage rates remained stable. As a rule, when the marriage 
frequency increases temporarily the mamage age falls (Table 3). 
The changes during 1989 deviate born this pattern and merit comment. From 1988 
to 1989 the number of mamed persons per 1000 of population more than doubled, 
born 5.20 to 12.80. The bulk of the increase occurred during the last month of 1989. 
The mamage age of both males and females increased by 3.1 years (Table 3). Thus 
couples who were already living together got mamed. The reason for this 
unprecedented mamage peak was that the pension regulations were to be altered 
on 1 January 1990. In point of fact only a few were affected by the changes but in 
the public debate it appeared as if people who were cohabiting without being 
married were going to be big losers. 
Table 3. Age at first mamage for men and women; number of divorces per 1,000 
married women; 1950-1989. 
Year Men Women Difference Divorces 
* the decline is due to an increase in marriages in 1989. 
However, it is not the trend of marriage rates which attracts the greatest interest 
during the postwar period but cohabitation and divorce. Between 1970 and 1980 the 
divorce frequency almost doubled in Sweden (Table 3). Another characteristic 
feature is that cohabitation outside matrimony increased rapidly from the 1960s 
onwards. It is true that cohabitation has ancient roots in Sweden, but it is only 
recently that it has attained widespread dissemination. Among young people 
cohabitation is the wholly predominant mode of life together, while one-third of all 
who live together between ages 30-34 are cohabiting. Even though cohabitation has 
become increasingly common in many West European countries, Sweden (along 
with the other Nordic countries) does occupy a special position (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Proportion cohabiting (persons living in consensual unions in relation to 
persons mamed plus cohabiting) in Sweden, Netherlands, Austria and Italy, 1985. 
The new outlook on living together has led, from the 1960s onwards, to a 
continuous increase in the proportion of children born outside wedlock (Figure 5). 
Today fewer than half of all children are born in wedlock. 
V 
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Year 
Figure 5. Number of extramarital births in relation to the total number of births, 
1949-1989; in percent. 
The trend of population in most industrialized countries during the twentieth 
century is characterized not only by falling birth rates and decreasing family size but 
also by increased average life expectancy. Here, too, developments in Sweden have 
been similar to those in other countries, more so than in the case of births. As in 
many other countries, death risks have fallen more rapidly for females than for 
males during the postwar period (see U.N., 1987). In Sweden, however, the increase 
in average life expectancy at birth has developed similarly for both sexes during the 
1980s. While the difference in average life expectancy at birth was 2.7 years in favor 
of females in 1950, it was 5.8 years in 1988 (Table 4). The entire increase results 
from differences in death risk at age 60 years and over. At the same time excess 
mortality among males was greater below age 60 than above. This may seem 
paradoxical but since the death risks are very small at active ages, the wide 
differences between males and females of active age affect the differences in 
average life expectancy to an insignificant degree. 
The difference in mortality trends between females and males since the beginning 
of the 1950s results from the fact that mortality from diseases of the circulatory 
organs diminished more among females than among males. The main cause seems 
to have been improved diagnosis. 
Another feature which also seems to be common in many industrialized countries 
is that married people have significantly lower mortality than unmarried. Divorced 
males show a specially high mortality. This seems attributable in part to a selection 
process--alcohol problems underlie both divorces and premature death--and in part 
to changed lifestyles following divorce. 
Table 4. Life expectancy at birth and at age 60, and number of survivors at age 80 
per 1000 born; men and women; 1950-1989. 
Year e, w e, m e, diff e, w e, m e, diff survivors at 80 yrs 
women men 
The large number of females alive in relation to the number of males, especially at 
ages over 80 years, means that many women are compelled to spend a considerable 
part of their lives as pensioners without life partners (Table 4). The high divorce 
frequency reinforces this phenomenon. 
3. THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION 
The age structure of the population is changed when fertility and mortality are 
changed.6 Migration can affect the age structure as well. The fact that the 
proportion of older people in the majority of industrialized countries is much higher 
today than it was at the beginning of the century is almost exclusively the result of 
falling birth rates (see Coale, 1957). Declining mortality has therefore had only a 
slight effect up to the last decades. If fertility is stabilized at the same time as 
mortality continues to fall, e.g. through improved diagnosis and improved methods 
of treatment, the extension of the motorway network or reduced smoking or other 
factors, nevertheless it is mortality which will chiefly affect age structure in future. 
That Sweden today, with 18% of its population in the 65-plus age group, has the 
highest proportion of old people in the world therefore results from the fact that 
the decline in the birth rate was steeper in Sweden than in other industrialized 
countries. On the other hand the proportion of people over 65 in Sweden will not 
%ith the same birth and death rates, all populations would gradually attain the same age 
structure. 
increase for some time ahead--though the proportion of the very old will in~rease .~  
However, this primarily affects the costs of nursing, care and accommodation, not 
pension payments. Those becoming pensioners today have higher pensions of course 
than those who retired earlier. 
Today there are over 30 old age pensioners to every 100 persons of working age. 
The corresponding figure in the middle of the nineteenth century was fewer than 
10. The increase has come about mainly during the postwar period, i.e. 
simultaneously with the expansion of the pension system.8 
Despite the fact that the proportion of older people is much higher in Sweden than 
in other countries, still the total dependency burden, measured as numbers of 
children and old people in proportion to numbers of working age, is not that much 
higher. This is due to the low birth rate of the 1970s and that the "baby-boom" 
generation still belongs to the labor force. 
Accordingly a gradual decline in fertility has caused the proportion of older people 
to increase. But because of the birth peaks of the 1940s and 1960s and the latter 
half of the 1980s, the proportion at different ages varies widely in step with the 
passing of the birth groups through the population pyramid. Large birth cohorts first 
increase the pressure on maternity clinics, then on day nurseries and nursery 
schools, and then on the school system. But since not all individuals attend school 
for the same length of time, entry into working life, and starting to cohabit, takes 
place more gradually. The effects on the labor market, as on the housing market, 
will therefore not be equally accentuated. It will still not be negligible, as the great 
housebuilding programs of the 1960s testify. The age of parents at the birth of the 
first child also varies, which means that the effect of a "baby boom" will not be 
equally strong. But because the pension age is fixed the whole effect will recur at 
retirement. Therefore when the 1940s generation reaches retirement, which will 
take place about the year 2010 given the present pension age, the number of 
pensioners will increase rapidly. In addition to the strain to which the pensions and 
care systems are subjected by virtue of the fact that the number of older people is 
increasing in the long term, they will thus also be subjected to the type of strain that 
schools suffered, for example, when the number of children was varying up and 
down. 
4. THE POPULATION MODEL 
The model which is used for the projections was developed at IIASA. It is a kind 
of standard projection with the help of current condition and transition intensities. 
 here is also a tendency to underestimate the numbers of the very old because of the projection 
methods which are used. This is primarily because period and not cohort death risks form the 
groundwork for the prognoses and partly because of the methodology employed. See SCB, 1987. 
'A sharp rise occurred during the 1880s as well. See Bengtsson and Fridlizius, 1992b. 
It utilizes aggregated data of different conditions (categories, regions, states). In the 
present case it employs, in addition to the categories male and female, four 
categories of civil status, viz. single never previously married, married, divorced and 
widow/widower. Unlike gender, transitions occur here between several of the 
various categories. Transitions can take place simultaneously for both sexes but 
between different categories of civil status. Thus a single woman never previously 
married, for example, may marry a divorced man. In this way one event, in this case 
a marriage, affects several transfers and conditions simultaneously. Another joint 
effect is that the number of married persons must always be the same for males and 
females. Divorces and widowhood are other examples of joint effects. Other 
transitions again affect only one category. This applies to births as well as to deaths 
among single persons. 
The starting point for this study is the number of females and males in every 
five-year age group in the four different categories of civil status in 1985. Another 
starting point consists of actual transition intensities between different conditions 
in the period 1980-84, i.e. births, marriages, divorces, changes of residence, deaths 
etc. A projection is made on the basis of this information for every fifth year up to 
the year 2050. This projection constitutes a "benchmark, i.e. a reference point, and 
shows the result of unchanged transition intensities, i.e. that the behavior we had 
in 1980-84 will continue until the year 2050. Further, net external migration for 
different sexes and ages are assumed to be zero. These assumptions are quite 
unrealistic of course. Nor is it the aim to describe the most probable development. 
However, the result comes very close to the prognosis made by Statistiska 
Centralbyrdn (SCB) in 1986. Benchmark projections are being made for all 
countries included in the study. 
Five more projections are made in addition to this benchmark scenario, making six 
projections in all. As well as the benchmark scenario three other scenarios are 
based on assumptions which are common to all countries included in the study. The 
reason why certain assumptions are the same is that the purpose of the comparative 
study of which this report gives the Swedish groundwork is not to make the most 
realistic projection but rather to examine how a number of possible demographic 
changes affect the age structure of the population and the civil status of old people 
and how this in turn affects the pension system and only then results are 
comparable to the other studies. 
The following four scenarios are accordingly common to all countries: 
1. The benchmark scenario, where the transition intensities from 1980-84 remain 
unchanged, shows the structure, and the behavior which is already present 
among the population. The assumptions are therefore the same for all 
countries but the values vary. 
2. The high-fertility scenario, where fertility is assumed to return to "replacement 
level" in the year 2005, remaining constant thereafter. This means an increase 
for all countries except Czechoslovakia and Poland. Other assumptions are as 
in the benchmark scenario. 
3. The low-mortality scenario, in which death risks are assumed to fall by 30% for 
females and 45% for males up to the year 2005, remaining constant thereafter. 
The diminution implies a rise in average age of about 8-10 years for males 
and 4-5 years for females. Other assumptions are as in the benchmark 
scenario. 
4. The West European scenario, in which the most extreme values in Europe up 
to now are combined. In all countries fertility in the year 2005 is assumed to 
have reached West Germany's present level, i.e. a cumulative fertility of 1.28. 
Mean life expectancy is assumed to be as in Switzerland, i.e. 74 years for 
males and 81 years for females. Marriage and divorce frequencies are assumed 
to be as in Sweden where one-third never marry, the marriage age is 28 years 
for women and 30 for men, and one-third of all mamages are dissolved by 
divorce. 
The benchmark scenario has already been commented on. As has already been 
observed, it lies close to the 1986 population prognosis. Despite the fact that 
Sweden today has already reached the level of fertility assumed in the high-fertility 
scenario, this projection nevertheless justifies its appellation. The reason is that 
fertility is not expected to become any higher. The fall in death risks in the 
low-mortality scenario is significant, so this scenario too shows an extreme situation. 
In the fourth joint scenario several assumptions are combined simultaneously, and 
this applies also to the two national projections. However, as far as Sweden is 
concerned it is only the assumption about fertility that is changed, since the 
marriage assumptions refer to Sweden and since average life expectancy is broadly 
the same in Switzerland and Sweden. The West European scenario therefore 
becomes a pure low-fertility scenario for Sweden. The advisability of using Swedish 
marriage and divorce frequencies for other countries' projections must be 
questioned since the extent of cohabitation is quite different in Sweden compared 
with the other countries in the study. Cohabitation also affects the realism of the 
projections for Sweden, a point to which we shall revert. Another general reflection 
is that it seems quite improbable that all changes in transition intensities will cease 
after the year 2005. In some cases, e.g. as regards mortality, it is to be expected 
instead that there will be more change after that year than before? At all events 
it is not realistic that the processes will be frozen in 2005. 
The National 1 scenurio is based on the same assumptions as the main 
alternative in the official 1989 prognosis (see SOS 1989). It is therefore based 
on analysis of the cohort fertility and the assumptions about this in the future. 
These cohort assumptions have then been converted to period assumptions. 
The result is that the period to the TFR is estimated to decline over the next 
few years and then climb slowly until the year 2010, when it will be 1.9 for all 
females regardless of whether they are married or not. It is assumed that it 
will then be constant. The assumptions about mortality are based on analysis 
9 ~ n  important factor which seems to favor such a development is the reduced smoking among 
children and young people. 
of the period mortality, not the cohort mortality. Mortality is assumed to be 
independent of civil status and to decrease until the year 2010, remaining 
constant after that. The decrease corresponds to an increase of 1.4 years in 
mean life expectancy of males and of 2.0 years in that of females compared 
with 1989. The national prognoses differ from the four joint ones in the 
migration assumption. In the National 1 prognosis Sweden's immigration 
surplus is assumed to fall from 29,000 in 1988 to 10,000 in 2010, which is the 
main alternative in the official 1989 prognosis. In the four joint scenarios net 
migration is assumed to be nil. The aim of the National 1 scenario is in the 
first place to compare the prognosis methodology on which the IIASA- 
prognosis is based with that employed in the official SCB prognosis. The latter 
is based on one-year age groups and is made for every year. In the second 
place, the National 1 projection supplements the official one in that it shows 
how the proportion of single persons will develop in future given the 
population structure and the divorce frequencies we have today. 
The result of the National 1 scenario turns out to coincide almost completely with 
the official prognosis. The difference is biggest in the year 2025, the last year of the 
official prognosis, when the total population according to National 1 is just under 
one percent below the official prognosis. Bearing in mind that the projections are 
based on different starting years, and that National 1 is based on five-year figures, 
not l-year figures like the official one, the result is very good. National 1 can 
therefore be said to be identical to the main alternative in the 1989 prognosis. 
6. The Nationd 2 scenario is based on the assumption that fertility changes to 1.8 
in the year 2010 and is then constant, while at the same time mortality 
decreases even after the year 2010. The rate of decrease is assumed to be the 
same as in SCB's low alternative, which means an increase of 2.2 years for 
males and 2.8 years for females until the year 2010 compared with 1989. 
Death risks are assumed to continue falling thereafter at the same rate as 
before, which is justified by the argument that only then do new and more 
smoke-free cohorts come up to the risk age-zone. 
Two further projections have been made based on the benchmark scenario. In the 
one case the actual death risks for different categories of civil status have been used 
instead of the same death risk regardless of marital status. Married persons, as 
already discussed, have lower death risks than single persons, especially divorcees. 
The differences are greatest in the 3040 year age range but are very low despite 
this compared with the death risks for older persons. The differences in death risk 
among the gainfully employed therefore do not lead to any major differences in life 
expectancy. The excess mortality of single persons diminishes with age but is still 
2040% higher at age 65 than it is for married persons. 
In the second case, account has been taken of cohabitation. In this case, too, the 
starting point is the benchmark scenario. As was noted above, cohabitation is much 
more widespread in Sweden than in any other country. The calculations of future 
population according to marital status must therefore be supplemented by figures 
in which regard is also paid to cohabitation. This problem is far too complex in 
terms of both content and data to permit it from being analyzed in detail here. A 
separate study of cohabitation will therefore be carried out shortly. The results 
which are discussed here are based on a simplified model and data only from 1986. 
Despite this it is hoped that the result gives some clue as to the direction in which 
cohabitation affects the other results. 
5. FUTURE POPULATION 
Sweden's population will decrease continually unless immigration continues to be 
greater than emigration, as is shown by Figure 6, which gives total population 
according to the six scenarios. In both national scenarios, population increases until 
about 2030, which is therefore attributable to net immigration. 
Figure 6. Population size 1950-1985 and forecasts until 2050 according to the 
different scenarios; in thousands. 
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The gap between the scenario giving the lowest population, i.e. the West European, 
and the two national ones is very wide. Population in the year 2050 will be only 5.2 
million if fertility declines to the same level as prevails today in West Germany and 
many other countries, including Denmark, and if net immigration is nil. According 
to the national scenarios the population will be just over 8.6 million in that year. 
The difference will therefore become large in time, but even before the year 2010 
it will be more than a million. Then how extreme are these scenarios? Neither of 
them is especially extreme. Many countries today show the same fertility as the 
scenarios are based on. Therefore the conclusion must be that there is considerable 
uncertainty as to whether Sweden's population will increase or decrease in future 
but that any increase presupposes an immigration surplus. 
All scenarios show a pronounced rise in the proportion of older people after the 
turn of the century whether the population increases or decreases (Appendix Table 
Al). Only on the assumption that fertility is high does the proportion diminish 
somewhat, and even then not until after the year 2030. The increase will apparently 
be greatest in the West European scenario, according to which 38 percent of the 
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population will be over 60 years of age in the year 2050, but the low mortality 
alternative gives similar figures also. The major part of the increase takes place as 
early as the beginning of the century. 
However, the number of pensioners in proportion to the gainfully employed 
population is of greater interest than the mere proportion of pensioners bearing in 
mind the way in which their pensions, medical care, etc., are financed today. Figure 
7 shows the proportion of pensioners in proportion to the population aged 15-64 
years (see also Appendix Table A2). Between the years 2000 and 2015 the number 
of pensioners per persons aged 15-64 years will rise from 0.21-0.22 to 0.27-0.33. 
Thereafter it continues to rise in all scenarios until about the year 2030. The 
nation's total dependency burden is also expected to increase sharply during this 
period, as is revealed by Figure 8, which shows the proportion under 15 years and 
over 65 years in relation to the population aged 15-64 years (see also Appendix 
Table A2). Further into the next century only about 55 percent of the population 
will be of working age. 
40 
Figure 7. Number of persons age 65 years and above in relation to population aged 
15-59; 1985-2050; in percent. 
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Figure 8. Number of persons aged 0-14 and 65 years and above in relation to 
population aged 15-59; 1985-2050; in percent. 







Given the mamage and divorce frequencies which we have today, the proportion 
of persons aged 60 years and over living alone will increase sharply regardless of 
future fertility and mortality (Appendix Table A3). In all scenarios the proportion 
single, i.e. persons who have never been mamed, rises from about 10 percent to 
about 30 percent in the year 2050. The proportion of mamed persons may decline 
from today's 45 percent to about 20-25 percent while at the same time the 
proportion of widows and widowers also declines. The low mamage and high 
divorce rates are totally dominant--different fertilities and mortalities lead to only 
minor modifications. Therefore the conclusion must be that the proportion of 
elderly persons living alone can be expected to rise sharply unless our social 
patterns change completely. A rise in the number of unmarried persons increases 
the load not only on the pension system but even more so on the medical and care 
services, as they often live alone. 
In all scenarios death risks are assumed to be equally high regardless of civil status. 
As an alternative to the benchmark scenario this assumption has been dropped and 
actual death risks for the period 1980-84 have been employed instead. Since the 
death risks for single persons are higher than for married persons this ought to 
moderate the rise in the proportion of single persons. 
The proportion of married persons becomes distinctly higher if account is taken of 
differences in death risks between different categories of civil status, as shown in 
Table 5. The number of married women increases by 3-4 percentage points 
compared with the benchmark. The equivalent figures for men are 4-6 percentage 
points. The rise in the proportion of single persons is therefore distinctly less when 
the assumption of equal death risks is dropped, but it will still be very large. The 
processes of family formation and dissolution are paramount. 
Table 5. Proportions mamed according to the benchmark scenario and according 
to an alternative calculation in which mortality by civil status is considered, 
1985-2050. 
Women Men 
Year Benchmark Alternative Difference Benchmark Alternative Difference 
As has already been pointed out, many people today live together without being 
married. However, this is true of pensioners to only a limited extent. Only about 
two percent of this category were cohabiting outside matrimony in 1985. What is the 
future pattern likely to be in this respect? Is cohabitation generation-related, so that 
the proportion of older people cohabiting will increase in future? There is much to 
indicate that this is so. Taking the 1985 transition intensities between unmarried, 
cohabiting and married persons of different ages as a starting point, certain 
calculations can be made. Interplay effects between singlelcohabiting categories and 
mortality have not been taken into account in this. The figures show that the 
proportion of persons cohabiting over 60 years of age will gradually increase 
(Figures 9 and 10). 






Figure 9. Number of single women aged 60 years and above in relation to the total 
number of women aged 60 years and above; 1985-2050; in percent. 
Figure 10. Number of single men aged 60 years and above in relation to the total 









According to these alternative calculations to the benchmark scenario a 
considerable part of the decline in the proportion of married people will be offset 
by the rise in the proportion cohabiting. Since changes in patterns of marriage and 
Low mortality 
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-- National 1 
-- National 2 
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cohabitation can take place swiftly, as the rise in marriage frequency in 1989 has 
shown, and because our model is not quite complete, we refrain from presenting 
any figures. A separate study will be made instead. The conclusion i's unambiguous, 
however. With present patterns of family formation, part of the decline in the 
proportion of married people over 60 years of age will be offset by increased 
cohabitation. The proportion of single persons will increase, however, but the 
negative effects of an increased proportion of single persons on the pension system 
and especially on medical care will be moderated somewhat. 
6. THE SWEDISH LABOR MARKET 
Since the end of the 1960s, the labor force measured as the number of persons has 
increased considerably more than the number of persons of working age. Thus, for 
example, the number of persons aged 20-64 years rose by 75,000 between 1970 and 
1985, while the labor force rose by 592,000 during the same period. This is 
attributable exclusively to increased female participation in the labor market--the 
percentage of females at work rose from 59.3% to 79.2% during the period while 
that of males fell by 1 percentage point. Despite this increase in the number of 
persons composing the labor force, the number of hours worked fell by an average 
of 0.2% per year, partly because of longer holidays and increased parental leave 
(i.e. paid leave of absence from work, taken by either parent, following childbirth). 
Figures 11 and 12 show the labor force participation rates (LPR) of males and 
females at work in different age groups since 1963. 
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Figure 11. Labor-force participation rates for males in different age groups 1963-88. 
Source: Jonung and Persson, 1990. 
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Figure 12. Labor-force participation rates for females in different age groups 
1963-88. Source: Jonung and Persson, 1990. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the curves for females in employment manifest 
a distinct M-shape, signifying that to a large extent women stay out of the labor 
market during the years when they have small children and return to it later. This 
pattern has now completely disappeared, and in 1988 the proportion of females 
aged 25-55 belonging to the labor force was about 90%. The M-shape does recur, 
however, although to a less marked extent, if we measure instead the proportion of 
females actually in gainful employment, which is indicated by the percentage 
gainfully-employed figure shown in Figure 13." 
One explanation of the differences between these two measures for females is 
parental leave, which was greatly augmented during the period and which gives 90% 
compensation for twelve months' loss of income for each child and another 3 
months with lower compensation. Very little advantage is taken of this provision by 
males. 
Measured in terms of labor-force participation rates the differences today between 
male and female participation in the labor market are small. However, females 
work part-time to a considerably greater extent than males even though there is 
some equalization arising from the fact that during the period 1963-1988 females 
increased their average working week by 5.9 hours at the same time as males were 
reducing theirs by 7.7 hours." 
'%he concept has been introduced by Jonung and Persson (1990): Unemployed persons and 
persons absent on holiday, sick leave and leave of absence have been deducted from the numerator. 




Figure 13. Percentages of females actually in the labor market in different age 
groups 1963-88. Source: Jonung and Persson, 1990. 
Historically speaking, a changed employment pattern has been the paramount factor 
underlying changes in the labor force, and at the same time this means that the role 
played by population changes has been much obscured. Despite this, in making 
projections of the labor force we have elected to proceed in terms of constant 
labor-force participation rates and unchanged figures for working females in the 
various age groups (1985 values). In this way the significance of demographic 
change is isolated. It may be pointed out that as the labor force participation rates 
of Swedish women are very high, both historically and compared with most other 
countries, we do not expect any dramatic changes in this labor market pattern. 
Nevertheless, our assumption of constant rates constitutes a limitation. Effects on 
the pension system of the trend of labor force participation rates assumed by SCB 
(1990) are therefore discussed in the chapter on impact of selected policy measures. 
In Appendix Table A4 projections of the labor force based on 1985 labor market 
figures are shown. In Table 6, changes in the labor force are shown. 
Table 6. Change in the labor force 2000-2050; in percent. 
1985/2000 2000/15 2015130 2030150 
National 1 + 6.4 -2.6 -3.1 -1.1 
National 2 + 6.4 -1.8 -4.4 -3.7 
The labor force will increase up to the turn of the century.12 After the turn of the 
century the labor force will diminish regardless of scenario, see Table 4 (see also 
Appendix Table A4). 
One underlying factor is that the age structure is changed (see Appendix Table As). 
The proportion of the labor force which is at its "most active working age", 35-54 
years, will decline. 
7. THE PENSION MODEL 
In all the countries included in the IIASA studies, public pension systems are 
organized as pay-as-you-go systems (PAYG), the characteristic feature of which is 
that the contributions of the gainfully employed in a given year are used for paying 
out pension benefits to current pensioners. The functioning of such a system can be 
summarized in the following equation: 
where q is the contribution rate, y is average wage income, L is labor force, b is 
average pension benefit and R is number of retirees. 
The left-hand term of the equation gives the total revenue from contributions and 
the right-hand term the sum of pension benefits disbursed. q and b are the pension 
system's parameters, which must be changed when there are changes in any of the 
other variables in order to bring revenue and disbursements into balance. L and R 
are determined partly by purely demographic factors such as fertility, mortality and 
migration, but also by labor force participation rates, age at entry to the labor 
market, and retirement age. To a certain extent the latter aspects of L and R are 
influenced by political decisions and can thus be viewed as parameters in the 
pension system. Another factor affecting the labor income as well as the age 
structure of the labor force is the number of hours worked. 
The equation for a pure PAYG scheme shows that if pension benefit, b, is fixed by 
the regulations and income grows, then ceteris paribus the contribution rate, q, can 
be reduced and if q is fixed then b can be raised. In the present study interest is 
concentrated on the purely demographic factors and the way in which expected 
changes in the latter influence the pension system, i.e. q and/or b. Therefore 
income, y, is assumed to be constant. The Swedish pension system is, as mentioned 
earlier, extremely sensitive to economic growth (see Table 2). The National Swedish 
Insurance Board recurrently calculates the development of the pension system at 
different growth rates under the assumption of a specific demographic development. 
There is no reason to repeat these calculations here. However, calculations of the 
effects of different demographic scenarios on the pension system have not been 
12~ssuming that the labor-force participation rates for females will continue to move closer to that 
for males, the labor force will increase up to the year UK35 and decrease thereafter (see SCB, 1990). 
made before. Our calculations, with constant income which means that the effects 
of demographic changes are isolated, may thus be seen as complementary to the 
calculations made by the National Swedish Insurance ~ 0 a r d . l ~  
The IIASA pension model is based on the general formula for "pay-as-you-go" 
systems modified with country-specific features. The following model is used for 
Sweden. 
Total contributions are defined as: 
contrihtion rate [g px*L.x] B 
where p, = average pension points in the x-th cohort (5-year age groups) 1985, and 
L, = number of persons in the labor force in the x-th cohort. Due to lack of data 
on incomes below the floor and above the ceiling the calculation of the 
contributions are based on total average income in this version. B is the base 
amount. Pension points, p, are calculated as 
Total pension benefits are determined by: 
i-1 where p, =  
15 
for the 15 highest pi which the j-th individual had while gainfully employed. pj is 
estimated by p, t/N is the proportion of full pension and is the actual values for 
those who were pensioners in 1985 and estimated values for those who were in the 
labor force in 1985. The values for p, and t/N are shown in Appendix Tables A6 
and A7. R is the number of pensioners. 
l3~nother eason to proceed on the supposition of constant incomes is that if contributions are 
determined as a proportion of wages and the resultant revenue is applied to the payment of current 
pensions, the trend of income has no significance as regards the development of the pension system. 
The model underestimates the total number of pensioners in 1985 by about 7%. 
The group includes old age pensioners and early retirement pensioners over 55 
years of age. The underestimate can be partially explained by lack of information 
on new-entrant early retirement pensioners, who have therefore been estimated as 
the difference between the number of early retirement pensioners for different 
years. Benefits are underestimated, partly because of the understatement of the 
total number of pensioners and partly because orphans' pensions, early retirement 
pensions prior to age 55 and widows' pensions prior to age 55 have been excluded. 
For these reasons, the results presented in this report ought not to be regarded as 
prognoses to be compared with those produced at the National Swedish Insurance 
Board. The simplification of the model facilitates comparisons between the 
countries, but above all it isolates the influence of demographic changes on the 
pension system. 
The initial values for the calculations are those which applied in 1985. In the model, 
sex- and age-specific labor force figures are used for projections of the labor force. 
Also, the number of hours worked is assumed to be unchanged in the various sex 
and age groups. The labor-force participation rates give an average retirement age 
of 63 years. New regulations, including transitional rules, are in force for the 
survivors pensions from 1990 onwards. Calculations have been made for both the 
old and the new system. 
8. PROJECTIONS OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS UNDER THE 
PENSION SYSTEM 
The demographic model and the pension model are linked together and used for 
making projections of the pension system based on different population trends. The 
trend of the pensioner ratio (L/R) is of great significance in a PAYG system, as is 
shown clearly by the equation for such a pension system. Table 7 shows the trend 
of the pensioner ratio for the various demographic scenarios. The number of 
pensioners per person in the labor force will decline somewhat over the next 10-15 
years. After that there will be a very pronounced rise in the pensioner ratio. This 
development, when coupled with the way a PAYG system works, makes it apparent 
that the pension system will be subjected to very strong pressure by virtue of 
demographic trends. 
Table 7. Pensioner ratio, estimated as number of pensioners/number of persons 
in labor force (labor-force participation rates, 1985). 
Benchmark 0.38 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.54 
High fertility 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.44 
Low mortality 0.39 0.55 0.67 0.72 
Western Europe 0.37 0.48 0.58 0.70 
National 1 0.37 0.45 0.50 0.48 
National 2 0.37 0.46 0.54 0.56 
Expenditure on pensions will rise very markedly, as is shown by Figure 14, where 
the pension benefits for six demographic scenarios are shown. The rise is greatest 
up to 2015-2030 and is followed by a levelling-off and in some cases a fall (see also 
Appendix Tables A7 and A8). 
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Figure 14. Expenditure on old age pension for different demographic scenarios. 
Index, 1985 = 100. 
Expenditure on pension benefits rises during the period from 1985 onwards until 
just after the turn of the century despite the fact that in most cases the pensioner 
ratio falls somewhat. One of the reasons for this is that those who were pensioners 
in 1985 had lower average pension points and a lower number of pension-accruable 
years, i.e. a lower t/N, than those who will become pensioners later. This effect will 
probably have vanished almost completely around 2005, when the maturing period 
of the system will be ended. The increases to be seen after that result largely from 
demographic changes. Another factor underlying the rises in benefit expenditure is 
that more and more women will have qualified for ever- higher pension benefits. 
Increases in expenditure such as are shown in Figure 14 cannot be covered by 
prevailing contribution rates at constant incomes. If neither contribution rate nor 
pension benefits are changed a heavy deficit will make its appearance in the 
pension system. Revenue from contributions will defray only a limited portion of 
pension benefits (see Table 8; Appendix Table A9 shows this ratio for all 
scenarios), which means that the rest, amounting in certain cases to half the 
expenditure, must be met from other taxes or by borrowing. 
If there is a resentment against increasing other taxes or raising the level of 
borrowing, what remains is to reduce pension benefits and/or to increase 
contributions. It is worth pointing out that the funds built up during the initial phase 
of the ATP system are far from sufficient if it should be considered to utilize them 
so as to avoid raising contributions or reducing pension benefits. Calculations show 
that using the funds for pension payments while keeping contributions and benefits 
at today's level would exhaust the funds shortly after the turn of the century. Table 
9 therefore shows by how much benefits would need to be cut for a given 
contribution rate. 
Table 8. Proportion of pension benefits covered by revenue from contributions at 
1985 contribution rate (= 19.5%). 
National 1 
National 2 
Table 9. Cuts in benefits (compared with 1985). 









As pointed out earlier, the Swedish pension system is so designed that pension 
benefits are determined by means of the system of regulations. It therefore falls to 
the contributions side to make the adaptation to changed demographic and/or 
economic conditions. From here on, therefore, the exposition will concentrate on 
comparisons of so-called balanced contribution rates, i.e. the contributions necessary 
to defray the promised pension benefits. Concerning pension expenditures (see 
Appendix Tables A7 and A8) the only operative factors are the number of 
pensioners and their civil status, while the labor force and its distribution between 
age groups also have significance for the trend of balanced contribution rates. The 
effect which different demographic trends have on the pension system is indicated 
by Table 10, which shows what contributions are required in order to defray pension 
expenditures. 
Table 10. Balanced contribution rates (actual rate in 1985 = 19.5%). 









It is worth reiterating that none of the scenarios are implausible or inconceivable. 
The range covered by the various scenarios also means that all conceivable 
population trends are accounted for. Regardless of which of these population trends 
actually comes about, it is obvious that it will be difficult to convince those who are 
of working age in 2015 and thereafter that the pension contributions they are paying 
are reasonable. 
In the calculations we do not take into account the fact that persons in the labor 
market have the possibility to adapt their behavior in the labor market to changes 
in the contribution rate. As is evident from the description of the Swedish pension 
system, to an individual the link between the contribution side and the benefit side 
is very weak. This means that a large part of the contribution is a pure tax which 
may result in a decrease in labor supply in response to increases in the contribution 
rate shown in Table 10 (see i.e. Hansson and Stuart (1985) for estimations of tax 
efforts on labor supply). Such a reaction diminishes the contribution base leading 
to the need for even higher contribution rates. We did not find it worthwhile to 
include a scenario with these labor market reactions since the calculations are not 
to be perceived as prognoses of an expected development. The intention is only to 
give some examples of the effects of the present rules of the pension system. Even 
without an elastic labor supply we expect the pension system to be changed. 
A comparison between the benchmark scenario and that in which high fertility is 
assumed shows that it is not until after 2015 that high fertility has a reducing effect 
on the necessary contribution level. The reason, of course, is that there is a delay 
of about 20 years before the rise in the number of children has any effect on the 
size of the labor force, thus helping to increase the contribution base. Nor does high 
fertility then lead to any dramatic reduction of contributions: in 2030 a reduction 
by 2.3 percentage points and in 2050 by 7.5 percentage points from a level of over 
40% of wages in 2050. It is plain that high fertility offers no solution to the pension 
problem even in the long term. 
The scenario in which mortality is assumed to continue falling is the one which is 
most devastating for the pension system. Even at the turn of the century 
contributions need to be 50% higher than today. By 2015 they ought to be more 
than twice as high, and by 2050 they would need to amount to more than half of 
wages. 
The scenarios which we consider the most interesting are National 1 and 2. National 
1 is the main alternative in SCB's population prognosis of 1989, and National 2 is 
based on this but with the hypothesis of lower fertility and lower mortality than in 
the main prognosis. The new regulations for survivors' pensions are applied in both 
cases, Table 11 shows changes in number of pensioners and number of persons in 
the labor force for these two scenarios and what change in the contribution rate 
follows from these changes. 
Table 11. Change in number of pensioners (R), number of persons in the labor 
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Until the turn of the century, the labor force increases more than the number of 
pensioners. Despite this there is an increase of contributions by 8.3 percentage 
points. The reason, as already noted, is that the ATP system is still in its maturing 
phase and that those who were pensioners in 1985 have lower average pensions 
than those retiring later. Moreover, the transitional regulations for the changed 
survivors' pension mean that expenditure on this pension element will rise during 
the period. 
The pension system will be under pressure from two directions during the first three 
decades of the next century. The number of pensioners will increase by about 20% 
in the first 15 years and by 8% and 13% respectively in the second 15 years, 
simultaneously with a decrease in the number of persons in the labor force. In both 
scenarios it is the rise in the number of pensioners which constitutes the prime 
cause of the estimated increases in contribution rates. The contraction of the labor 
force is responsible for only about 10% of the rise in contribution rates during the 
first 15-year period and for about 25% during the period 2015-2030. 
The number of pensioners will fall between 2030 and 2050. The small birth cohorts 
born during the 1970s will be retiring on pension during this period. The lower 
mortality assumed in National 2 implies a considerably lower fall in the number of 
pensioners than in the National 1 case--a mere 0.5% compared with almost 5%. In 
the National 1 case the decrease in the number of pensioners is greater than the 
decrease in the labor force, which makes it possible for the contribution rate to be 
lowered. In the National 2 case we have a continued sharp reduction of the labor 
force coinciding with a fall in the number of pensioners that is only marginal, and 
this causes a continued raising of the contribution rate. 
Up to the year 2015 the balanced contribution rate is almost the same in the two 
cases. Not until later do lower fertility and mortality produce effects on the pension 
system. 
The behavior of males and females on the labor market differs, and one of the 
results of this is that women have lower average wages than men (see Appendix 
Table A6). Since the pension system is based for the most part on the 
loss-of-income principle, the lower wages paid to women also lead to their having 
lower old age pensions than men, as is shown by Table 12. 
Table 12. Average old age pension of men and women, 1000s SEK. 
Men 57 76 77 
Women 34 56 5 6 
The average woman's pension in 1985 was just under 60% of the average man's. It 
will rise to about 74% around the turn of the century and remain at that figure. 
This does not mean of course that women are treated unfairly by the pension 
system itself. From Table 13, which shows the ratio between contributions and 
benefits distributed by sex, it can be seen that on average women pay a considerably 
smaller proportion of their pension benefits than men. 
Table 13. Ratio between total contributions and total benefits distributed by sex 
at the 1985 contribution rate (= 19.5%); National 2 scenario. 
Men 1.21 0.96 0.74 0.63 0.6 1 
Women 0.77 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.36 
Total 1 .OO 0.70 0.58 0.50 0.49 
There are several properties of the pension system which bring this about. Women 
are prone to more frequent and lengthy interruptions associated with childbirth than 
are men, and parental leave is accruable for pensions but not for contributions. The 
contribution is not differentiated according to sex. Differences in mortality between 
the sexes cause women to receive their pensions for more years than men and also 
to receive survivors' pensions more often than men. 
9. IMPACT OF SELECTED POLICY MEASURES 
The development of the pension system generated by the demographic projections 
and the design of the system will enforce changes in one way or another. Here 
effects on the economy of the pension system are shown for three kinds of changes. 
Two of them are changes in labor supply, the third is a change in the rules for 
calculating pension-points (the 15-year rule) and the period of service for full 
pension (the 30-year rule). 
One change which is studied is a raising of the retirement age by two years. As a 
result of early retirement pensions, partial pensions and so on, the average 
retirement age in 1985 was de facto 63 years. The effect on balanced contribution 
rates of a raising of the average retirement age to 65 years is shown in Table 14 for 
the benchmark scenario. Compared with the actual retirement age in 1985, such a 
change would signify that the level of contribution rate required in order to finance 
pension benefits could be almost 5 percentage points lower in 2015 and over 7 
percentage points lower in 2030. 
In all scenarios, the labor-force participation rates have been assumed to be 
constant at the 1985 values. In Section 6 above, it is shown that the vast majority 
of changes in the labor force are caused by changes in labor-force participation 
rates, not by population changes. Even though by international standards Sweden 
already has a high level of female participation in the labor market, this is expected 
to rise further for females in the age range 25-64 years, while for young women and 
for males of all ages it is expected to fall (see SCB, 1990, Table 10). The effect of 
such changes on the pension system is shown in Tables 15 and 16. 
Table 14. Balanced contribution rates if mean age at retirement is 65 compared 
with actual retirement age at 63. 
2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 
Retirement age 
65 years 24.9 29.9 32.4 31.4 
63 years 28.2 34.7 39.7 40.5 
Difference -3.3 -4.8 -7.3 -9.1 
Table 15. Balanced contribution rates based on different assumptions regarding 
labor supply; National 2 scenario. 
LPR for 1985 19.5 27.8 33.5 38.9 39.7 
LPR according to 
Trender och proenoser* 19.5 25.9 31.4 36.7 37.4 
Difference - -1.9 -2.1 -2.2 -2.3 
* SCB, 1990. 
Table 16. Ratio between total contributions and total benefits at labor force 
participation rates according to SCB, 1990. 
Females 0.77 0.57 0.5 1 0.45 0.43 
Males 1.21 0.94 0.73 0.61 0.60 
Total 1.00 0.75 0.62 0.53 0.52 
Difference compared 
with LPR for 1985 - + 0.05 + 0.04 + 0.03 + 0.03 
A comparison of the ratio between contributions and benefits at the labor force 
participation rates for 1985 (see Table 13) and those according to Trender och 
promoser (SCB, 1990) shows firstly that changed labor-force participation rates 
affect the system's "finances" favorably and secondly that first and foremost they 
affect the distribution between males and females. With such labor market behavior, 
women will pay for a considerably larger proportion of their pensions, while the 
men's proportion will diminish. 
As mentioned before the link between the contribution side and the benefit side in 
the ATP-system is very weak. Both the 15-year rule and the 30-year rule contribute 
to this weakness. Discussions about changing these rules have been brought up on 
several occasions, most recently in the report of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Pensions (SOU 1990:76), without any results, however, in the form of proposals. In 
Table 17 the effect of an extension of the number of years on which benefits are 
based is shown. In Table 18 this change is combined with an extension of the period 
of service for full pension from 30 to 40 years. The calculations have been carried 
out for the National 1 case. The effects are the same for the rest of the scenarios. 
Table 17. Ratio between contributions and benefits with a change in the 15-year 
rule. 
Benefits based on number of 
years with highest income 
15 years 1 .O 0.70 0.59 0.54 0.56 
20 years 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.57 
30 years 0.72 0.6 1 0.56 0.58 
entire working life - 0.77 0.65 0.59 0.62 
Table 18. Ratio between contributions and benefits with a change in the 15-year 
rule combined with a change in the 30-year rule from 30 to 40 years. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benefits based on number of 
years with highest income 
15 years 1.0 0.79 0.63 0.57 0.59 
20 years - 0.80 0.64 0.57 0.60 
30 years - 0.81 0.65 0.58 0.61 
entire working life - 0.87 0.69 0.62 0.65 
A change in the 15-year rule to a 20- or 30-year rule gives only minor improvements 
in the economy of the pension system. The ratio between contributions and benefits 
rises a couple of percentage points. A change in the 30-year rule has a greater 
effect. A comparison of the first row in the two tables shows the effect of changing 
this rule to a 40-year rule. The ratio between contributions and benefits increases 
from 70% to 79% by 2000 and remains about 3 percentage points higher thereafter. 
If this change is combined with a change in the 15-year rule, some additional 
improvement is gained. 
The improvement in the economy of the pension system to which these changes of 
rules give rise is almost exclusively due to a deterioration of women's pension 
benefits compared to the benefits of today. As shown in Table 13, women are 
subsidized by the present rules. Some of these subsidies will disappear with the 
changes studied. Men's pension benefits will hardly be influenced at all by these 
changes. 
10. THE FZTTWRE OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 
The pension system involves very long-term commitments. Throughout their working 
lives, individuals are building up by means of their contribution payments an asset 
which comes to fruition in the form of pension benefits during their retirement 
years. From the standpoint of the individual the pension system establishes a 
distribution of consumption over the life cycle via levels of contributions and 
pension benefits. In a PAYG system the assets which individuals build up are not 
funded but take the form of charges on the result of future production whereby the 
working generations of the future, through their contributions, relinquish part of 
their incomes. In this way the pension system, via the regulations governing it and 
the levels of contributions and benefits, establishes the distribution between persons 
belonging to the labor force and pensioners. For the pension system to work this 
distribution must be perceived as reasonable. Figure 1 measures how this 
distribution evolved between 1970 and the mid-1980s. Table 19 presents calculations 
of the corresponding trend assuming that the contribution is raised in order to cover 
the pension benefits established according to the regulations. 
Table 19. Pension per old age pensioner in proportion to net wage per employed 
after deduction of balanced contribution. 
National 1 0.65 0.97 1.06 1.11 1.09 
National 2 0.65 0.97 1.06 1.16 1.18 
On the assumptions applied in the IIASA model and provided the pension system 
is not changed, persons in the labor force and pensioners will have about the same 
scale of consumption by the turn of the century. After the turn of the century the 
pensioner will have a larger scale of consumption than the employed even before 
taking into account that such a person often has children to maintain. It is difficult 
not to believe that the development of such a situation will lead to reappraisal of 
the system. 
The projections in this report are made on the assumption that there will be no 
growth. As remarked above, the Swedish pension system is sensitive to growth, so 
that with an annual growth rate of 2% or more contributions do not need to be 
raised to anything like the extent shown in this report (see Table 2 and RFV, 1987). 
Three comments can be made on this. Firstly, the Swedish economy with its 
structural problems offers little hope of high growth in the future. Secondly, growth 
leads to an implicit reappraisal of the system. The reason why rises in contributions 
remain at a low level when there is growth is that more and more people reach 
incomes above the ceiling. These incomes are reckonable for contributions but not 
for pensions. For an increasing number of people, therefore, the loss-of-income 
principle will no longer apply, and this can be regarded as an implicit change of the 
pension system. Thirdly, there are negotiated insurance schemes, primarily to cover 
loss of income for incomes above the ceiling. This means that the apportionment 
of scales of consumption between employed and pensioners shown in Table 19 will 
still apply, broadly speaking, even if there is growth. 
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APPENDIX A. Tables. 
Table A l .  Population in age groups 0-14, 15-59 and 60 years and above, 1950-2050. 
Absolute numbers Percent 
0-14 15-59 60t total 0-14 15-59 60+ total 
Benchmark Scenario 
High Fertility Scenario 
Low Mortality Scenario 
Western European (low fertility) Scenario 
National 1 - Scenario 
National 2 - Scenario 
Table A2. Number of persons below 15 years, 65 years and above and the two 
groups together in relation to the population aged 15-64 years, 1985-2050; percent. 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Under 15 
Benchmark 18.0 16.7 15.8 15.6 14.6 
Fertility 17.5 18.5 19.0 18.9 
Mortality 16.7 15.8 15.6 14.6 
Western 15.9 2.9 12.0 10.1 
National 1 18.2 17.8 18.4 17.9 
National 2 18.4 17.0 17.7 16.8 
65 and Over 
Benchmark 22.9 22.3 28.0 30.9 29.7 
Fertility 22.1 26.8 28.1 24.4 
Mortality 23.4 32.8 38.5 38.8 
Western 22.6 29.8 35.0 37.6 
National 1 21.8 27.1 29.7 27.9 
National 2 21.7 27.7 32.1 32.0 
Total 
Benchmark 40.9 39.1 43.9 46.5 44.4 
Fertility 39.7 45.3 47.1 43.3 
Mortality 40.2 48.5 54.0 53.4 
Western 8.5 42.7 46.9 47.7 
National 1 40.0 44.8 48.2 45.8 
National 2 40.2 44.7 49.8 48.8 
Table A3. Marital composition of the population aged 60 years and over, 1985-2050. 
Women Men 
Single Married Divorced Widowed Total Single Married Divorced Widowed Total 
Benchmark scenario 
High Fertility scenario 
Low Mortality scenario 
Western European (low fertility) scenario 
National 1 - scenario 
National 2 - scenario 
Table A4. Labor force in age range 16-64 years at 1985 relative labor force 
participation rates (1000s). 
Benchmark 4157 4239 3895 3496 3035 
National 1 4157 4424 4310 4 178 4 13 1 
National 2 4157 4424 4346 4156 4002 
Number of pensioners in age range 65 and older at 1985 relative labor force 
participation rates (1000s). 
Benchmark 1585 1579 1807 1852 1636 
National 1 1585 1621 1943 2100 2002 
National 2 1585 1623 1983 2252 224 1 
Table A5. Proportion of labor force in different age groups distributed by sex (1985 
relative labor force participation rates). 
Females  ales 
National 1 
National 2 
Table A6. Average pension points, 1985, used as input in the pension model. t/N 
is estimated on actual figures for new entrants to disability for those under 65 years 
of age and on actual figures for those over 65. 
Average pension Proportion of 
points full pension (t/N) 
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Table A8. Pension expenditures 1985-2050. Index 1985 = 100. 
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